New York Times
Details of
the plan are sketchy, but Americans had been promoting the force as a crucial
stopgap to combat rising violence here and frustration with the slow pace of
training permanent professional security forces — the bottom-line condition for
the American military to begin pulling back from an increasingly unpopular war.
Many parts of
Afghanistan have no soldiers or police officers on the ground.
Over 12
days of talks, Gen.
David H. Petraeus, the new NATO commander, overcame the objections of
President
Hamid Karzai, who had worried that the forces could harden into
militias that his weak government could not control. In the end, the two sides
agreed that the forces would be under the supervision of the Afghan Interior
Ministry, which will also be their paymaster.
“They would
not be militias,” said Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon spokesman, at a briefing in
It is, he
added, “a temporary solution to a very real, near-term problem.”
The program
borrows from the largely successful Awakening groups that General Petraeus
created in
In fact,
the program runs the risk of becoming too popular — it will create a demand in
poor communities around the nation that could turn it into an unwieldy and
ineffective job creation program.
While some
American officials said the forces could have as many as 10,000 people enrolled,
Afghan officials indicated that they wanted to keep them small, especially in
the beginning.
Questions
remain, too, about whether the Interior Ministry will be able to manage the
forces. While the ministry’s leadership in
American
military officials said, however, that they would be intimately involved, and
that United States Special Forces units, which have created smaller-scale
programs locally, especially in southern Afghanistan, would continue to set up
and train the forces.
The
agreement was hammered out during a particularly violent spasm in the war here.
Seven American service members were killed on Tuesday and Wednesday in southern
The
negotiations were an early test for General Petraeus, appointed overall
commander in
The
relatively fast agreement on this new force could give momentum to the general’s
efforts to work closely with Mr. Karzai’s government and move forward on other,
still harder issues, including improving Afghan governing skills and decreasing
corruption.
Depending
on how quickly the program starts running, it could also help NATO forces
control the Taliban in areas where there are few NATO soldiers. People close to
Mr. Karzai said he had resisted earlier efforts to expand another iteration of
the program that was largely created by the Americans and organized by Special
Forces units because he feared that it could undercut his government’s power and
foster the creation of militias.
“We have
tribal rivalries, and tribes may think they can benefit from this, and it could
strengthen rivals in a village,” Waheed Omar, the spokesman for the Afghan
president, said in an interview this week. “We don’t want a short-term objective
to endanger a long-term objective for security.”
Another
worry was creating any government structures reminiscent of the period of
Communist rule here, when Muhammad Najibullah, then the president, created local
armed forces to help bolster the government’s fight against rebels — a move that
alienated many Afghans.
This week,
General Petraeus offered a new proposal that included a number of elements to
help make the program more acceptable to Mr. Karzai. Mr. Omar said that the
president was looking for agreement on safeguards to ensure that the program did
not get out of control.
It was
particularly important to Mr. Karzai that it come under his government’s
jurisdiction, that the forces be uniformed and that their chain of command run
through the Interior Ministry because several other local forces created during
nearly nine years of war here had only a tangential relationship to the Afghan
authorities — or undermined them.
The new
Afghan forces will be armed, but their role will be “purely defensive,” said a
senior NATO official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not
authorized to speak on the record.
“In some
cases people may bring their own stuff, but part of the goal of getting
government support is to standardize equipment,” he said. “They will be armed
and equipped and trained to defend their communities.”
Community
defense has deep cultural roots in
There are
now several different semiofficial armed forces operating in the country; they
would all be “gradually disbanded and reintegrated” into a single new force
named the Local Police Force, according to a statement released Wednesday by the
Afghan
National Security Council.
One major
risk of the program, which all sides tacitly acknowledge, is that it will
multiply the number of well-armed people in Afghanistan, which even with
safeguards could foster fighting rather than quell it.
For that
reason, perhaps, both Mr. Karzai’s administration and the American military are
describing it as a short-term remedy to the problem of a lack of police officers
and soldiers in many areas of the country.
“Our
position has been to develop a solution that bridges between having nothing and
having Afghan National Police, and this program does that,” said the senior NATO
official. “So it’s a good development and especially so since it has consensus
within the Afghan government and the ownership that come with that,” he said.