The Richard Barlow Case
Excerpt from: National Security Whistle Blowers
Congressional Research Service
In 2002, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims decided the case of Richard Barlow,
who in the late 1980s faced termination from the Defense Department and suspension
of security clearances following disputes within the executive branch, and between
the executive branch and Congress, about
central questions reportedly were whether executive officials had misled lawmakers,
in secret briefings, regarding
Administration had improperly certified to Congress that
nuclear weapons.201
After a number of investigations by the Defense Department and several by
inspectors general and the General Accounting Office regarding retaliations against
Barlow’s whistleblower activities, a bill was introduced (S. 2274) to provide for the
relief of Barlow.202 The private bill included the sum of $1,100,000 to compensate
him for losses incurred as a consequence of “(1) personnel actions taken by the
Department of Defense affecting Mr. Barlow’s employment at the Department
(including Mr. Barlow’s top secret security clearance) during the period of August
4, 1989, through
with the Department of Defense on
Senate referred the matter to the Court of Federal Claims requesting that it report
back findings of fact and conclusions “that are sufficient to inform the Congress of the
nature, extent, and character of the claim for compensation referred to in such bill
[S. 2274] as a legal or equitable claim against the United States or a
gratuity.”204
State Secrets Privilege
Barlow and his attorneys, through the discovery process, sought documents
which they alleged would show that Congress had been misled about
capabilities. They claimed that the evidence would show a motivation on the part of
Barlow’s supervisor in the Defense Department to take adverse personnel actions
against him for his whistleblowing. On
Tenet signed a declaration and formal claim of state secrets privilege and statutory
privilege. The declaration denied Barlow and his attorney access to any of the
classified intelligence information under Tenet’s control. Tenet said that it would not
be possible “to sanitize or redact in any meaningful way” the information that Barlow
sought.205 A separate declaration by Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, Director of the
National Security Agency, also invoked the state secrets privilege to assert the
agency’s privilege over NSA intelligence reports and information from intelligence
reports contained in minutes of the Nuclear Export Violations Working Group
(NEVWG) meetings.206
The Tenet declaration did not automatically block Barlow’s access to the
requested materials. Tenet acknowledged that the branch that decides what evidence
to admit is the judiciary, not the executive branch: “I recognize it is the Court’s
decision rather than mine to determine whether requested material is relevant to
matters beings addressed in litigation.”207 The Hayden declaration did not contain
that language, but courts have discretion to determine whether an executive claim of
state secrets privilege should be treated as absolute or as qualified. The Court of
Federal Claims had several options. It could have ordered the government to provide
a full public account of why disclosure of the information would harm national
security.208 It could have conducted “an in camera examination of the requested
materials”209 and also asked that sensitive material be redacted to permit access by
Barlow.
Options for the Court
In a decision filed
Federal Claims initially acknowledged that the state secrets privilege was qualified,
not absolute. Although it noted that some courts have held that state secrets are
“absolutely privileged from disclosure in the courts,”210 it stated that “the mere formal
declaration of the privilege does not end the court’s inquiry.”211 Toward the end of
this analysis, however, the court ruled that state secrets were absolute: “The privilege
is absolute, the law having evolved to reflect a choice of secrecy over any balancing
of risks and harms.”212 The court concluded that the documents sought by Barlow,
“to the extent not already produced or located, are privileged in toto.”213
The court continued the trial and allowed the government to introduce the
documents and testimony to support its case, while at the same time denying Barlow
access to documents and testimony he requested to support his position. On May 4,
2000, Barlow’s attorneys, Paul C. Warnke and Diane S. Pickersgill, objected that the
state secrets privilege should not apply to congressional reference cases to prevent
Barlow and the court access to “key evidence.”214 Warnke and Pickersgill argued that
the court should review the documents in camera.215 They noted that the Senate had
ordered the court to “make a determination of the merits” of Barlow’s claim for
compensation and that the information he sought in discovery was “necessary for this
Court to make a fully-informed decision and thus a fully-informed recommendation
to Congress.”216
Applying Egan
In the
“temporary suspension” of Barlow’s security clearance.217 In Egan, the plaintiff’s
security clearance had been revoked. The court stated that in Egan the Supreme
Court held that “the authority to protect classified information remains within the
Executive Branch,” determinations about security clearances are an attempt to predict
an individual’s future behavior, and that such “‘[p]redictive judgment of this kind
must be made by those with the necessary expertise in protecting classified forward
with matters that are security matters about which they are concerned and
they disclose them to people who are cleared to received such information.”225
This debate raised the possibility that leaking information to the press would put
reporters at risk. One Member stated that “this [bill] does not pertain to the news
media.”226 Another saw “nothing [in the bill] to prevent reporters from being hauled
in before grand juries and being forced to reveal their sources.”227 Chief executives
of four of the largest news organizations (CNN, the New York Times, Newspaper
Association of
him to veto the bill. The Radio-Television News Directors Association also joined
in this appeal to President Clinton.228
President Clinton vetoed the bill on
he said that the bill “was passed without benefit of public hearings——a particular
concern given that it is the public that this law seeks ultimately to protect. The
Administration shares the process burden since its deliberations lacked the
thoroughness this provision warranted, which in turn led to a failure to apprise the
Congress of the concerns I am expressing today.”229
200 115
Stat. 1399-00, § 309 (2001).
201
202 For a
description of these investigations, see Barlow v.
390-92 (2002).
203 S.
2274, 105th Cong., 2nd sess. (1998). 204
144 Cong. Rec. 23357 (1998).
205
Declaration and Formal Claim of State Secrets Privilege and Statutory Privilege
by
George J. Tenet, Director of Central
Intelligence,
Congressional Reference No. 98-887X, at 9
(hereafter “Tenet Declaration”). Available from
author.
206
“Declaration of Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, United States Air Force,
Director of the National Security Agency, Feb.
2000, Barlow v.
Congressional Reference No. 98-887X. Available
from author.
207 Tenet
Declaration, at 7.
208
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2nd 51, 60-64 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
209
690 F.2nd 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
211 Barlow
v.
212
213
214
Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for a Protective Order, Barlow v.
United
States, Congressional Reference No. 98-887 X, at
1.
215
216
217
Barlow v.
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
The above is excerpted from:
The Congressional
Research Service, Library of congress
National Security
Whistleblowers
Below is the summary
and table of contents from the report.
Summary
To discharge its constitutional duties, Congress depends on information
obtained from the executive branch. Domestic and national security information is
provided through agency reports and direct communications from department heads,
but lawmakers also receive information directly from employees within the agencies.
They take the initiative in notifying Congress, its committees, and Members of
Congress about alleged agency illegalities, corruption, and waste within the agency.
This type of information comes from a group known as whistleblowers.
Through such techniques as “gag orders” and nondisclosure agreements,
Presidents have attempted to block agency employees from coming directly to
Congress. In response, Congress has enacted legislation in an effort to assure the
uninterrupted flow of domestic and national security information to lawmakers and
their staffs. Members of Congress have made it clear they do not want to depend
solely on information provided by agency heads. Overall, the issue has been how to
protect employees who are willing to alert Congress about agency wrongdoing.
The first procedures enacted to protect agency whistleblowers appeared in the
Civil Service Reform of 1978. It also contained language that excluded protections
to whistleblowers who work in federal agencies involved in intelligence and
counterintelligence. In 1989, Congress passed the Whistleblower Protection Act in
an effort to strengthen statutory protections for federal employees who assist in the
elimination of fraud, waste, abuse, illegality, and corruption. That statute continued
the exemption for national security information. It did not authorize the disclosure
of any information by an agency or any person that is (1) specifically prohibited from
disclosure by any other provision of law, or (2) “specifically required by Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign
affairs.”
Several statutes apply expressly to national security information. Congress has
passed a series of laws known collectively as the Military Whistleblowers Protection
Act, under which members of the military may give information to Members of
Congress. It also passed the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act
of 1998 to encourage the reporting to Congress of wrongdoing within the intelligence
agencies. In crafting this legislation, Congress has sought to balance its need for
information with national security requirements, giving intelligence community
whistleblowers access to Congress only through the intelligence committees. For
legal analysis see CRS Report 97-787 A, Whistleblower Protections for Federal
Employees, by L. Paige Whitaker and Michael Schmerling.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
“Gag Orders” and Lloyd-LaFollette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The “Gag Orders” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Lloyd-LaFollette Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Whistleblowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Special Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
National Security Exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Communications with Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Inspectors General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Defense Department IG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A Statutory IG for the CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Creating the Federal Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Whistleblower Protections in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Competing Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Making it Easier to Punish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1985 House Hearings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Office of the Special Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Congressional Action, 1986-88 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Proposed Legislation in 1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Action in 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
The Mt. Healthy Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Pocket Veto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
WPA Amendments in 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
MSPB and Federal Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Military Whistleblowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1956 Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Whistleblower Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Nondisclosure Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Department of the Navy v. Egan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
The District Court’s Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Funding Restrictions (Nondisclosure Forms) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Funding Restrictions (Access to Congress) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
OLC Opinion in 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Oversight of Intelligence Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Reach of Lloyd-LaFollette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
“Need to Know” by Lawmakers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
CIA Whistleblower Act of 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
The Senate Bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
The House Bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
“Sole Process” and “Holdback” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Authority Over Classified Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
The Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
The Richard Barlow Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
State Secrets Privilege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Options for the Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Applying Egan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
“Official Secrets” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Pending Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Appendix: Whistleblower Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Government Accountability Project (GAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
National Security Whistleblowers Coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Project On Government Oversight (POGO) . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43