July 3, 2010
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Gen. David H. Petraeus' arrival in Kabul this week, after being
unanimously confirmed by the Senate as the head of U.S. and NATO forces in
Afghanistan, is a good time to revisit the goals and challenges confronting
nearly 100,000 American troops there.
The strategic goal as defined by the Obama administration is to prevent
Afghanistan from being used as a base by Al Qaeda or other groups that seek
to attack the United States and its allies, as it was during the Taliban's
rule and 9/11 strikes. To that end, Afghan and international forces are
trying to rout the Taliban insurgency and help create a stable government in
the capital of Kabul.
Simple. Clear. And elusive.
While acknowledging the enduring strength of the Taliban combatants,
Petraeus said he will stick with the counterinsurgency strategy that he
helped design and his predecessor implemented. Clearly, there isn't time to
change course in the 12 months left before President Obama's July 2011
target for beginning to draw down U.S. forces. But also, Petraeus knows that
the problems are not strictly military. Force alone will not defeat the
Taliban.
Since the troop buildup began early this year, the U.S. military has
launched an offensive in the Taliban stronghold of Helmand province that
flagged when the government of President Hamid Karzai was unable to come in
behind with adequate security and civilian services. Because of that
failure, a second offensive in the city of Kandahar has been postponed. But
even if it goes forward, it is likely to have limited effect. As long as the
Taliban can count on supply routes and sanctuaries in Pakistan, it can fall
back, regroup and fight again.
The Pakistani government's strategic goal is to have more influence with
Kabul than does India, its historic enemy and political obsession. Karzai
recently held high-level talks with the Pakistani military and broached the
subject of Pakistani-facilitated negotiations with the Taliban. The Obama
administration would like to see better relations between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, though not a Pakistani puppet government in Kabul; it tentatively
supports making deals with Taliban leaders if they agree to renounce Al
Qaeda, abandon armed struggle and accept the Afghan constitution.
Many of these are political considerations, not military strategy. So
Petraeus and his troops can do their best on the battlefields of
Afghanistan, but unless he and other U.S. officials can get Karzai to
protect and provide for his citizens to draw support from the Taliban, and
unless they can persuade Pakistan to deny refuge to the insurgents, there
will be no victory for U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
Copyright © 2010, The Los Angeles Times