LA Times editorial

Elusive goals in Afghanistan

Unless the U.S. can get Karzai to provide for his citizens to draw support from the Taliban, there will be no victory.

July 3, 2010

Gen. David H. Petraeus' arrival in Kabul this week, after being unanimously confirmed by the Senate as the head of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, is a good time to revisit the goals and challenges confronting nearly 100,000 American troops there.

The strategic goal as defined by the Obama administration is to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base by Al Qaeda or other groups that seek to attack the United States and its allies, as it was during the Taliban's rule and 9/11 strikes. To that end, Afghan and international forces are trying to rout the Taliban insurgency and help create a stable government in the capital of Kabul.

Simple. Clear. And elusive.

While acknowledging the enduring strength of the Taliban combatants, Petraeus said he will stick with the counterinsurgency strategy that he helped design and his predecessor implemented. Clearly, there isn't time to change course in the 12 months left before President Obama's July 2011 target for beginning to draw down U.S. forces. But also, Petraeus knows that the problems are not strictly military. Force alone will not defeat the Taliban.

Since the troop buildup began early this year, the U.S. military has launched an offensive in the Taliban stronghold of Helmand province that flagged when the government of President Hamid Karzai was unable to come in behind with adequate security and civilian services. Because of that failure, a second offensive in the city of Kandahar has been postponed. But even if it goes forward, it is likely to have limited effect. As long as the Taliban can count on supply routes and sanctuaries in Pakistan, it can fall back, regroup and fight again.

The Pakistani government's strategic goal is to have more influence with Kabul than does India, its historic enemy and political obsession. Karzai recently held high-level talks with the Pakistani military and broached the subject of Pakistani-facilitated negotiations with the Taliban. The Obama administration would like to see better relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, though not a Pakistani puppet government in Kabul; it tentatively supports making deals with Taliban leaders if they agree to renounce Al Qaeda, abandon armed struggle and accept the Afghan constitution.

Many of these are political considerations, not military strategy. So Petraeus and his troops can do their best on the battlefields of Afghanistan, but unless he and other U.S. officials can get Karzai to protect and provide for his citizens to draw support from the Taliban, and unless they can persuade Pakistan to deny refuge to the insurgents, there will be no victory for U.S. troops in Afghanistan.